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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for damages for personal injuries 
sustained by the plaintiff Gilbert Capson in an industrial 
accident, allegedly as the result of the negligence of defen-
dants . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUftT 
The district court granted defendant Arctic Circle, 
Inc.'s motion to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint 
and dismissed the action as to said defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, commenced this action 
against defendants for personal injuries sustained by plain-
tiff Gilbert Capson in an industrial accident which allegedly 
resulted from negligence upon the part of the defendants. 
Defendant Arctic Circle, acting as its own contractor, was 
building a place of business. Plaintiff Gilbert Capson was 
employed by said defendant to do work on the foundation of 
the building. (R. 1, 33) 
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In plaintiffs' original complaint, they alleged in 
their first cause of action as follows: 
"2. On or about July 26th, 1972, plain-
tiff Gilbert Capson was a subcontractor doing 
foundation work on the premises of the defen-
dant Arctic Circle, Inc., , . . 
"3. Arctic Circle, Inc., or its contrac-
tors or agents performed excavation work on 
the premises, which excavation was five feet 
or more in depth below grade. 
If4. Plaintiff in performance of his 
subcontract obligation formed the foundation 
in the excavation provided by the defendant 
Arctic Circle, Inc., and concrete was ordered 
by Arctic Circle, Inc., to be poured in the 
forms provided by the plaintiff Gilbert 
Capson. 
"5. The defendant, Arctic Circle, Inc., 
by and through its agents directed the place-
ment of the A. J. Dean Ready Mix Concrete 
Company truck for discharging the concrete." 
(Emphasis added) (R. 1) 
These allegations were adopted by reference in plaintiffs' 
second and third causes of action. (R. 3) 
Plaintiffs subsequently obtained leave to file an 
amended complaint, increasing the prayer for damages. (R, 25) 
Defendant attacked plaintiffs' original complaint, as amended, 
by motion to dismiss. (R. 15-16) That motion was heard 
before Judge Croft, who granted the motion, with leave to 
plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. (R. 31-32) 
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Plaintiffs subsequently filed their second amended complaint, 
essentially restating the allegations of their original com-
plaint and adding a fourth count for benefits under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. (R. 33-40) In their second 
amended complaint, plaintiffs also added the following alle-
gation in Count I: 
"7. That the defendant Arctic Circle, 
Inc., directed the work of the plaintiff as 
to how he should hold the concrete forms dur-
ing said pouring.11 (Emphasis added) (R. 34) 
This allegation was likewise adopted in plaintiffs' second 
and third counts. (R. 35) 
Defendant Arctic Circle attacked the second amended 
complaint by a motion to dismiss, since the defects attacked 
by the original motion were not cured by the amendment, and 
in fact were exaggerated. (R. 41-42) The motion to dismiss 
the second amended complaint was heard by Judge Sawaya, and 
after hearing, and after being taken under advisement, the 
motion was granted. (R. 51-52) This appeal followed. (R.52) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF GILBERT CAPSON WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF DEFEN-
DANT ARCTIC CIRCLE, INC., WITHIN THE MEANtNG OF THE UTAH 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, AND THEREFORE HIS SOLE REMEDY IS 
FOR BENEFITS UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
In their brief, plaintiffs concede that the court's 
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ruling was correct insofar as it pertains to the third and 
fourth counts. (Plaintiffs* Brief, p. 8) This court, 
therefore, need consider only the correctness of the court's 
ruling as to Counts I and II. Plaintiffs also concede in 
their brief that plaintiff Gilbert Capson was acting under 
the direction and control of defendant Arctic Circle at the 
time of the accident. (Appellants1 Brief, p. 2) 
The argument advanced by plaintiffs in support of 
their appeal wholly disregards the basis upon which the trial 
court acted in granting this defendant's motion. Section 35-
1-42, U.C.A., 1953, insofar as material here, provides as 
follows : 
"Where any employer procures any work 
to be done wholly or in part for him by a 
contractor over whose work he retains super-
i ii i i. i i n i n W M i i 
vision or control, and such work is a part 
or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor, and all persons 
employed by him, and all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any 
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within 
the meaning of this section, employees of 
such original employer. . . ." (Emphasis 
added) 
Section 35-1-60, U.C.A., 1953, provides insofar as 
material here as follows: 
"The right to recover compensation pur-
suant to the provisions of this title for 
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injuries sustained by an employee, whether 
resulting in death or not, shall be the ex-
clusive remedy against the employer and shall 
be the exclusive remedy against any officer, 
agent or employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this 
act shall be in place of any and all other 
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or 
otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, 
widow, children, parents, dependents, next 
of kin, heirs, personal representatives, 
guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on 
account of any accident or injury or death, 
in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated 
or incurred by such employee in the course 
of or because of or arising out of his em-
ployment, and no action at law may be main-
tained against an employer or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer 
based upon any accident, injury or death of 
an employee. . . ." (Emphasis added) 
These statutory provisions have been interpreted 
by this court in a series of decisions commencing with Smith 
v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Ut.2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972), and 
Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Ut.2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972). These 
decisions were followed in Doyle v. Facilities, Inc., 29 
Ut.2d 41, 504 P.2d 1006, and Adamson v. Poland Construction 
Co., 29 Ut.2d 286, 508 P.2d 805. In the case last cited 
this court said: 
"In the recent case of Smith v. Brown 
we had occasion to consider a closely anal-
ogous situation. We there set forth the 
principles which should be considered in 
applying the Workmen's Compensation Act to 
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such a problem: that the purpose of the act 
is to provide speedy and certain compensa-
tion for workmen and their dependents and to 
avoid the delay, expense and uncertainty 
which were involved prior to the act; and 
the concomitant purpose of protecting the 
employer from the hazards of exorbitant and 
in some instances perhaps ruinous liabili-
ties. Those principles are applicable here 
and correlated to them is the proposition 
that the act should be liberally construed 
and applied to provide coverage and effec-
tuate those purposes. 
"Fundamental standards of justice dic-
tate that it would be inconsistent to apply 
the act liberally in favor of the injured 
workman in order to find coverage by one 
employer on a project, and then to reverse 
that policy and adopt a restrictive view to 
exclude coverage of another employer on the 
project so that a suit could be maintained 
against him. . . . 
11
'Where any employer procures any work 
to be done wholly or in part for him by a 
contractor over whose work he retains super-
vision or control, and such work is a part 
or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor, and all persons 
employed by him, and all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any 
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, . . . 
employees of such original employer.IM 
It was upon the basis of this line of decisions 
that both Judge Croft and Judge Sawaya determined that plain-
tiffs ! several complaints failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. 
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The case of Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., Inc., 
Ut.2d , 546 P. 2d 896, following the same reasoning 
and arriving at the same holding, was decided on February 20, 
1976, five days before the hearing on this defendant's motion 
to dismiss the second amended complaint. That decision had 
not come to the attention of counsel at tihe time of hearing, 
and therefore was not brought to the attention of the court, 
but it adds further support to the correctness of the trial 
court1s ruling. 
The allegations of plaintiffs1 several complaints, 
and particularly paragraph 7 of the first count of the 
second amended complaint, clearly bring tjhis case within 
the line of authorities above cited. Plaintiffs by their 
own allegations specifically establish that defendant Arctic 
Circle not only retained supervision or control over Gilbert 
Capson1s work, but actually controlled the details as to how 
the work should be performed. The trial court correctly 
held that under the provisions of Section 35-1-42, as it 
existed at the time of the accident, and as interpreted by 
this court, Gilbert Capson was an employee of defendant 
Arctic Circle, his sole remedy was under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, and that his several complaints failed to 
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted as against 
defendant Arctic Circle. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF LINDA CAPSON HAS NO ACTION FOR THE 
PERSONAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY HER HUSBAND. 
In their complaint, plaintiffs claim not only 
damages for the injuries sustained by Gilbert Capson, but 
his wife also claims damages for losses allegedly sustained 
by her. That such claims and actions are not recognized 
in this state under the married women's emancipation stat-
utes was firmly established by the holding of this court in 
Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Ut.2d 143, 493 P.2d 985, where it was 
said: 
"The wife has no basis for her action. 
At common law she could not sue for loss of 
consortium, and under the Married Women1s 
Act no cause of action was given to her for 
negligent injury to her husband. . . ." 
(Emphasis added) 
This is an additional ground for dismissing the action as 
against plaintiff Linda Capson. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint did not state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted as against defen-
dant Arctic Circle. The trial court correctly granted 
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defendant Arctic Circle's motion to dismiss, and the judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN & EVANS 
V-
Ray R. Christensen 
Attorneys for defendant 
and respondent Arctic Circle, Inc 
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